MUDANÇAS, REVOLUÇÕES E SUAS IMPLICAÇÕES -/- CHANGES, REVOLUTIONS AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS -/- Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva – IFPE-BJ, CAP-UFPE e UFRPE - [email protected] / [email protected] e WhatsApp: (82)98143-8399 -/- PREMISSA -/- A mudança social é um tema presente na Sociologia desde o seu início. Seria possível dizer que o surgimento da Sociologia está vinculado à discussão sobre as transformações sociais, ou seja, falar sobre a ciência da sociedade é falar sobre esse tema. Por isso mesmo, abordar o tema da (...) mudança social pressupõe lidar com a questão das resistências às possíveis transformações. Quando uma comunidade ou uma sociedade se depara com mudanças, de origem interna ou externa, há sempre resistência, pois há uma espécie de acomodação ao que já existe. Assim, as relações de poder, por exemplo, podem se modificar, num complexo jogo de resistência contra o poder e desejo de conquistá-lo ou ampliá-lo. Desse modo, confrontos e conflitos compõem o itinerário das mudanças e revoluções sociais. -/- Aqui serão objetos de análise dois grandes tipos de mudanças sociais: aquelas que, por seu caráter universal e multifacetado, afetaram toda a humanidade e aquelas de conotação sociopolítica, que atingiram determinadas sociedades e, depois, tornaram-se referência para outras mudanças. Serão, portanto, abordadas as revoluções agrícola e industrial e as recentes transformações e os episódios mais marcantes das revoluções políticas contemporâneas em todo o mundo. -/- A REVOLUÇÃO AGRÍCOLA -/- Esta revolução transformou radicalmente a forma de produção de alimentos das populações humanas. A expressão “revolução agrícola” foi criada pelo arqueólogo australiano Gordon Childe (1892-1957). Ela também é chamada de “revolução do Neolítico”, pois foi o período em que a humanidade desenvolveu a agricultura e as técnicas de cultivo de alimentos, como também aprendeu a domesticar e criar animais. Isso alterou o processo de obtenção de alimentos, pois as populações deixaram de ser coletoras e caçadoras e passaram, paulatinamente, a ter uma relação diferenciada com animais e plantas. Essas mudanças não ocorreram ao mesmo tempo em todos os lugares. Elas se iniciaram no Oriente Médio (há 9 ou 10 mil anos). Depois, no Egito (9 mil), na Índia (8 mil), na China (7 mil), na Europa (6,5 mil), na África tropical (5 mil) e na América, principalmente no México e no Peru (4,5 mil anos), através do deslocamento de hordas humanas ou movimentos independentes. O processo foi muito longo. Inicialmente, percebeu-se que os grãos que eram coletados para alimentação poderiam ser enterrados, isto é, “semeados”, a fim de produzir novas plantas iguais às que eram coletadas anteriormente. Assim, foi possível produzir trigo, cevada, milho, arroz e tubérculos (vários tipos de batatas); posteriormente, também árvores frutíferas. A partir de então, em consequência da experiência e da observação do que acontecia no meio ambiente, passou-se a selecionar sementes e outras árvores para plantio. Através da experiência prática, desenvolveu-se um conhecimento dos diferentes tipos de solo e de plantas, o que ajudou a aprimorar as técnicas de plantio e colheita, incluindo a observação da melhor época para o desenvolvimento de cada uma das culturas. Determinante para a fixação de grupos humanos (sedentarização) há milhares de anos, a agricultura ainda é a principal atividade de parte expressiva da população mundial. Essa atividade é a eminente na questão de desenvolvimento do Brasil, uma vez que o setor a cada ano emprega mais, a cada ano produz mais e a cada ano supera os índices de lucratividade anteriores, sendo, por fim, o baú do tesouro brasileiro. Voltando para a Revolução, outro elemento essencial desse processo foi a domesticação de animais. Junto com a agricultura, esse foi um passo muito importante para a alteração do modo de vida da humanidade, já que eliminou a necessidade do deslocamento para obtenção da carne e das peles necessárias ao conforto e também do leite dos rebanhos. A domesticação deve ter surgido espontaneamente em vários locais, resultado do processo de aproximação e observação dos animais no decurso das caçadas. O primeiro animal domesticado foi o cão; na sequência, animais para a alimentação e tração, como a cabra, o carneiro, o boi e o cavalo. Paralelamente a essas mudanças, alguns instrumentos foram sendo confeccionados, como a foice, o arado, a roda e outros que eram utilizados para arar a terra e até na colheita: novas tecnologias para um processo revolucionário. Esse processo intenso de subdivisões e deslocamentos provocou uma onda de difusão da agricultura e da atividade pastoril através das migrações. Imagine-se por um momento vivendo em grupos ou fazendo parte de hordas humanas, reproduzindo-se e subdividindo-se, migrando para outros locais, plantando e desenvolvendo a criação de animais em vários lugares, deslocando-se à procura de novos espaços e invadindo territórios de outros grupos, convivendo entre si ou em conflito, aprendendo e ensinando aos grupos com os quais estabeleceram alguma comunicação e submetendo-se ou sendo submetidos pelos habitantes com quem entraram em contato. Esse é apenas um pequeno esboço do que ocorreu nesse processo de transmissão e absorção de novas formas revolucionárias de viver. A grande revolução agrícola (que foi, em essência, a síntese de centenas de revoluções localizadas no tempo e no espaço e marcadas pela diversidade de ações e resultados) foi aquela que alterou de fato e profundamente toda a humanidade. Mas ela continua até hoje, uma vez que as transformações que ocorrem na produção de alimentos não estacionaram e mantêm um processo de mudança contínuo. Entretanto, existem ainda formas de organização social, como a de alguns poucos povos caçadores e coletores, que utilizam a agricultura e a domesticação de animais à moda antiga. -/- A REVOLUÇÃO INDUSTRIAL -/- O que se chama de Revolução Industrial na Europa nos séculos XVIII e XIX não é uma revolução puramente industrial, nem começou repentinamente nesses séculos. Foi um processo lento de transformação que se desenvolveu desde o século XV e atingiu grandes setores da produção, como o mineiro, o metalúrgico e o têxtil. A expansão da produção nesses setores envolveu a invenção de novas técnicas e máquinas, além de uma estrutura (a fábrica) que permitisse a concentração de equipamentos e trabalhadores num só lugar. Situadas quase sempre nas cidades, as fábricas requeriam muita mão de obra. Atraindo as pessoas que deixavam o campo em busca de trabalho, as cidades cresceram vertiginosamente. Transformava-se, assim, a forma de produzir bens e serviços, alterando as formas de viver e revolucionando as relações sociais. Mas isso não aconteceu de maneira uniforme no mundo todo. Para que se tenha ideia da multiplicidade das mudanças trazidas pela urbanização e pela industrialização, a Inglaterra conheceu esses fenômenos típicos da modernidade em torno de 1860; o Brasil, por volta da década de 1930; a China, a partir do final do século XX. A Revolução Industrial começou no setor têxtil, na produção da lã e do algodão, com o uso das máquinas de fiar conhecidas como Spinning Jenny (1764) e Spinning Mule (1789), inventadas, respectivamente, por James Hargreaves e Samuel Crompton. Nessa época, a produção era feita manualmente, com rocas de baixíssimo rendimento. Pode-se dizer que, paralelamente à Revolução Industrial, houve na Europa uma segunda revolução agrícola. Ela teve início com a mudança na estrutura da propriedade rural, quando os proprietários de terras se juntaram a ricos comerciantes das cidades interessados em investir na agricultura e promoveram a introdução de novas técnicas de cultivo, entre as quais a rotação de culturas sem pousio (parcela de terras em repouso), de forma a retirar o máximo proveito das terras; a drenagem de terras pantanosas; o abate de florestas; e a ocupação de terras comunais. No intuito de melhorar a produção, promoveram a seleção das espécies mais produtivas, de sementes e o apuramento dos melhores rebanhos. Além disso, foram introduzidas máquinas e houve melhora nos transportes no espaço agrário. Isso permitiu relativa abundância em produtos agrícolas essenciais (carne, leite e derivados, legumes, tubérculos, cereais etc.), que juntamente com a indústria extrativa do sal, indispensável para a conservação dos alimentos, propiciou a melhoria gradual na dieta alimentar. Essas mudanças e a diminuição crescente da mortalidade propiciaram o que se pode chamar de revolução demográfica. Para se ter uma ideia, na Inglaterra, onde a Revolução teve início, a população em 1750 era de 6,5 milhões; em 1801 passou a 16,3 milhões e, em 1851, somava 27,5 milhões. Isso exigiu um aumento da produção e de matérias-primas vegetais e animais (transformadas nas fábricas). No século XIX, outras transformações ocorreram em face da emergência de novas fontes energéticas (eletricidade e petróleo) e de novos ramos industriais, o que resultou em alteração profunda nos processos produtivos, com a introdução de novas máquinas e equipamentos. Todas essas transformações propiciaram mudanças nas comunicações (telégrafo e telefone), nos meios de transporte (navio e trem a vapor, automóvel) e também em todas as esferas da vida (familiar, educacional, jurídica, governamental etc.). Além disso, provocaram o surgimento de inovações na arte, na literatura e nas ciências. -/- AS REVOLUÇÕES CONTEMPORÂNEAS -/- Há uma grande transformação em curso nas sociedades humanas. Os grandes artífices dessas mudanças cada vez mais radicais são as inovações tecnológicas e os resultados alcançados pela evolução dos processos científicos. É difícil demarcar espaços que estejam imunes a essa era de revoluções múltiplas e de largo alcance: de algum modo, todas as culturas estão imersas nessa nova fase da aldeia global, em que tudo e todos parecem estar condenados à interconexão e às novas realidades na microeletrônica, na genética de laboratório e na nanotecnologia, para citar apenas alguns dos “admiráveis mundos novos”. A microeletrônica revolucionou a escala produtiva de bens e serviços mediante o desenvolvimento de sistemas computacionais. Provocou uma mudança significativa também nos meios de comunicação. O uso de celulares, smartphones, computadores pessoais e portáteis, tablets e outros tantos equipamentos está alterando a forma de as pessoas e organizações públicas e privadas se comunicarem e se estruturarem. Novos componentes eletrônicos produzidos com base na nanotecnologia poderão revolucionar o que hoje conhecemos por computação, permitindo a produção de computadores pessoais com muitos processadores, extremamente rápidos e com enorme capacidade de armazenamento. No futuro, os nanoprocessadores provavelmente estarão presentes na maioria dos objetos que utilizaremos. Por meio da microeletrônica e da nanotecnologia, o nível de desenvolvimento da bioengenharia (ou engenharia genética) beirará a ficção científica. A manipulação genética, com o aprofundamento do conhecimento do DNA humano, de plantas e animais, será ampliada. As pesquisas mais divulgadas nessa área se referem às possibilidades de intervenção no campo da Medicina, como as vinculadas à utilização de células-tronco, à produção de vacinas e medicamentos específicos, à produção sintética de elementos essenciais à saúde humana (como a insulina e a albumina), à análise genética das doenças e à consequente terapia gênica, aos transplantes, ao mapeamento genético dos indivíduos, à formação de bancos de genoma de espécies em extinção, à recuperação de DNA de espécies extintas e até à clonagem de animais. Essas transformações podem gerar, entretanto, novos desafios e suscitar questões atreladas, por exemplo, à privacidade dos indivíduos, ao acesso desigual à tecnologia, aos riscos ambientais (aos seres vivos, incluindo os humanos), às relações sociais e de trabalho, às mudanças de valores e normas sociais e, principalmente, às possibilidades de maior liberdade e igualdade ou maior opressão/controle, além de maior ou menor desigualdade social. A Sociologia, que, como vimos, nasceu na Europa no contexto de grandes transformações, propõe debates sobre essas novas tecnologias e as mudanças sociais provocadas pelo uso delas. São necessários novos olhares, novos conceitos e teorias para dar conta desses elementos que estão afetando a vida humana em todos os sentidos. A utilização de novos saberes e tecnologias alterará a pesquisa em todas as ciências, permitindo mais aprofundamento, através de novos equipamentos, com modificações sensíveis nos modos de conhecer o mundo. A aplicação e o desenvolvimento científicos exercerão impacto na maioria das indústrias existentes, em áreas como as de sistemas de construção, transportes, comunicações, maquinário agrícola, e, é claro, na prestação de serviços. Será possível fabricar materiais cem vezes mais resistentes que o aço, carros cuja lataria não estará sujeita a riscos, espelhos antiofuscantes, aviões mais leves, jornais eletrônicos de plástico semelhante ao papel, tintas que mudam de cor etc. No cotidiano, roupas que não amassam ou que não cheiram mesmo depois de absorver muito suor poderão ser compradas em supermercados; do mesmo modo, tecidos que controlam a temperatura do corpo, adaptando-o confortavelmente à temperatura do ar, serão vendidos a preços acessíveis em toda parte, ao lado de vestimentas que auxiliam no emagrecimento e em diversas atividades orientadas por médicos e profissionais de saúde e esporte. O futuro, então, logo trará roupas impermeáveis, inodoras e que não mancham, as chamadas roupas interativas. Esses são exemplos simples do que já existe, mas ainda não em escala industrial para consumo massivo. A presença de robôs no processo produtivo já é uma realidade insofismável e pode-se prever que em pouco tempo eles farão serviços domésticos e outras várias atividades que hoje são desenvolvidas por pessoas de carne, osso e alma. Veículos autônomos, ou os automóveis que andam sozinhos, estão sendo desenvolvidos e alguns já são utilizados para a alegria e o espanto de muita gente. Na área ambiental, a revolução tecnológica poderá ocorrer em muitos campos. Ganharão muita visibilidade o uso de materiais alternativos e a utilização do que hoje chamamos de resíduos industriais ou domésticos na fabricação de mercadorias. Todos esses resíduos, que hoje são descartados, inclusive os chamados não recicláveis, podem passar a ser matérias-primas para diferentes setores da economia. A máxima de Lavoisier (1743-1794) seria então plenamente consagrada: Na natureza nada se cria, nada se perde, tudo se transforma. Nem tudo são flores, entretanto. Acesso desigual aos frutos dessas mudanças; prejuízos ao meio ambiente (riscos aos seres vivos, incluindo os humanos), às relações sociais e de trabalho, aos valores e normas sociais e, principalmente, às possibilidades de maior liberdade e igualdade ou mais opressão e controle, além de maiores ou menores desigualdades sociais. Um conjunto de situações novas para as quais ainda não se tem respostas pode surgir da expansão tecnológica e do desenvolvimento da ciência. Assim como a energia atômica trouxe benefícios extraordinários e malefícios estarrecedores à humanidade, novas tecnologias e inovadores processos científicos poderão trazer grandes soluções e reviravoltas nas formas de ser e de viver, bem como enormes e imprevisíveis prejuízos e destruições. -/- BREVE CONCLUSÃO -/- As revoluções do passado e do presente se estenderão ainda por muito tempo, uma vez que são expressões da atividade humana, a qual transforma o meio e é por ele transformada. Não há transformações que não retenham algo do passado e, ao mesmo tempo, delineiem alguns traços do futuro, pois as mudanças, por mais radicais que sejam, sempre conservam algo. Além disso elas não ocorrem em todos os lugares nem atingem a todos da mesma forma, deixando abertas as portas da história. Essa imprevisibilidade da ação humana, calcada no tempo anterior e orientada para os dias posteriores, dá graça e mistério à existência, tornando a vida em sociedade um desafio de conquistas fabulosas e um palco de derrotas lampejantes. -/- REFERENCIAL TEÓRICO -/- ALMOND, M.; BATISTA, G. O livro de ouro das Revoluções. 2ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2018. -/- TOMAZI, N. D.; ROSSI, M. A. Sociologia para o ensino médio. Vol. Único. 5ª ed. São Paulo: Saraiva, 2016. -/- Todos os direitos reservados para Emanuel Isaque Cordeiro da Silva © 2019 Estimule a criatividade, respeite o direito autoral. -/- . (shrink)

Fragmentalism allows incompatible facts to constitute reality in an absolute manner, provided that they fail to obtain together. In recent years, the view has been extensively discussed, with a focus on its formalisation in model-theoretic terms. This paper focuses on three formalisations: Lipman’s approach, the subvaluationist interpretation, and a novel view that has been so far overlooked. The aim of the paper is to explore the application of these formalisations to the alethic modal case. This logical exploration will allow us (...) to study (i) cases of metaphysical incompatibility between modal facts and (ii) cases of modal dialetheias. In turn, this will enrich our understanding of the role of impossibility in the fragmentalist framework. (shrink)

Beliefs can be resistant to evidence. Nonetheless, the orthodox view in epistemology analyzes beliefs as evidence-responsive attitudes. I address this tension by deploying analytical tools on capacities and masking to show that the cognitive science of evidence-resistance supports rather than undermines the orthodox view. In doing so, I argue for the claim that belief requires the capacity for evidence-responsiveness. More precisely, if a subject believes that p, then they have the capacity to rationally respond to evidence bearing on p. Because (...) capacities for evidence-responsiveness are fallible and may be masked, beliefs can be held in the face of counter-evidence. Indeed, I will argue that our best science of belief supports the claim that evidence-resistant beliefs result from masks on evidence-responsiveness capacities. This account of belief not only allows for resistance to evidence, but provides us with a framework for describing and explaining actual cases of evidence-resistance. (shrink)

Delusions are deeply evidence-resistant. Patients with delusions are unmoved by evidence that is in direct conflict with the delusion, often responding to such evidence by offering obvious, and strange, confabulations. As a consequence, the standard view is that delusions are not evidence-responsive. This claim has been used as a key argumentative wedge in debates on the nature of delusions. Some have taken delusions to be beliefs and argued that this implies that belief is not constitutively evidence-responsive. Others hold fixed the (...) evidenceresponsiveness of belief and take this to show that delusions cannot be beliefs. Against this common assumption, I appeal to a large range of empirical evidence to argue that delusions are evidence-responsive in the sense that subjects have the capacity to respond to evidence on their delusion in rationally permissible ways. The extreme evidence-resistance of delusions is a consequence of powerful masking factors on these capacities, such as strange perceptual experiences, motivational factors, and cognitive biases. This view makes room for holding both that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive and that delusions are beliefs, and it has important implications for the study and treatment of delusions. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are epistemic norms on evidence-gathering and consider consequences for how to understand epistemic normativity. Though the view that there are such norms seems intuitive, it has found surprisingly little defense. Rather, many philosophers have argued that norms on evidence-gathering can only be practical or moral. On a prominent evidentialist version of this position, epistemic norms only apply to responding to the evidence one already has. Here we challenge the orthodoxy. First, we argue that (...) there is no significant normative difference between responding to evidence you have and gathering more evidence. Second, we argue that our practices of epistemically criticizing agents for their poor evidence-gathering indicate the existence of epistemic norms on evidence-gathering. Finally, we show that our thesis has important implications for recent debates about the relationship between epistemic norms and inquiry. (shrink)

The orthodox view in epistemology is that belief is constitutively evidence-responsive. I offer a novel argument for a version of this view, one that appeals to capacities to rationally respond to evidence. I do so by developing the Sellarsian idea that the concept of belief functions to mark the space of reasons in a non-intellectualist and naturalistic direction. The resulting view does justice to the role of belief in social interactions, joint deliberation, and rational persuasion, while including evidence-resistant beliefs and (...) animal beliefs as genuine beliefs. It has a range of further benefits: it helps us account for epistemic normativity, paves the way for better psychological models of belief revision, distinguishes beliefs from imaginings and mere acceptances, and helps us avoid noxious simplistic takes on human irrationality. (shrink)

Commentary on Pablo Hubacher Haerle’s paper “Is OCD Epistemically Irrational?”. I argue for expanding our assessment of rationality in OCD by considering a wider range of epistemic parameters and how they fit together.

Delusions are standardly defined as attitudes that are not amenable to change in light of conflicting evidence. But what evidence do people with delusion have for and against it? Do delusions really go against their total evidence? How are the answers affected by different conceptions of evidence? -/- This chapter focuses on how delusions relate to evidence. I consider what delusions-relevant evidence people with delusions have. I give some reasons to think that people typically have evidence for their delusions, and (...) that the evidence they have against them is often overstated. I draw on this discussion to consider whether delusions are evidentially supported and epistemically rational. Finally, I discuss implications for the nature of delusion, responsibility, and treatment and suggest directions for future research. Throughout, the discussion is sensitive to different conceptions of evidence and rationality in epistemology. -/- A central upshot is that what we should say about the epistemic standing of delusions depends substantively on our positions in epistemology, in particular, on the debate between internalists and externalists about evidence. If we want clarity on the epistemic standing of delusions, we need to incorporate more sophisticated tools from epistemology. (shrink)

Epistemic agents interact with evidence in different ways. This can cause trouble for mutual understanding and for our ability to rationally engage with others. Indeed, it can compromise democratic practices of deliberation. This paper explains these differences by appeal to a new notion: epistemic styles. Epistemic styles are ways of interacting with evidence that express unified sets of epistemic values, preferences, goals, and interests. The paper introduces the notion of epistemic styles and develops a systematic account of their nature. It (...) then discusses the implications of epistemic styles for central questions in epistemology, in particular, for issues surrounding rational engagement and for the debate between virtue epistemologists and epistemic situationists. (shrink)

This study determined the relationship between triarchic intelligences and engagement as factors in mathematics achievement of 1148 Grade 10 students in the Division of Davao del Norte, Philippines. It also investigated the relationship among the variables utilizing a descriptive-correlational and causal-comparative research design. Modified survey questionnaires were used for triarchic intelligence and engagement scales which were validated by the panel of experts. Standardized Division Unified Test was used to measure the mathematics achievement. Mean and Pearson product moment coefficient correlation were (...) used to determine the proficiency level and the relationship between the variables while multiple linear regression was also used to derive the value and identify the predictor variable. The findings of the study showed that students did not meet the expectations on mathematics achievement; triarchic intelligences and engagement were at moderate level. Among the six indicators, only behavioral engagement was the predictor of the achievement. This indicates that the mathematics achievement of the students is best anchored on engagement. Thus, the result suggests that the more engaged the students are, the better and higher the achievement in mathematics. (shrink)

Interest in the nature of religious and mystical experiences (henceforth RMEs) is old. Recently, this interest has shifted toward understanding the relationship between brain function and RMEs. In the first section, I introduce neurocognitive data from three experiments that strongly correlate the report of religious mystical experiences with specific neural activity. Although correlations cannot be considered as “absolute” proof, strong correlations provide us with inductive grounds for justifying the belief or nonbelief of some proposition. These data suggest that the human (...) brain plays a key role in having an RME and will provide support for the claim that our explanations for phenomena should be located in the natural world. In the next section, I explore the meaning of an RME from a Jamesian perspective and discuss the use of RMEs and the apparent design of the world as proof for God’s existence. My point is to show that the whole enterprise of using phenomena “that only God could have brought about” as the proof for God’s existence is inherently question begging and so is no proof that God exists. In the third section, I lay out in detail my assumptions for my main argument in the final section. There, I argue that belief in the supernatural is not justifiable given the data we have from contemporary science and basic rules of reasoning. (shrink)

The Golden Rule is (roughly) as follows: treat others as you would have others treat you. Philosophical reactions to it vary; it has both supporters and detractors. In any case, almost nobody who things critically about morality takes the literal version of the Golden Rule seriously, since there are just too many problems with it. To demonstrate this, I will look at a literal version of the Golden Rule espoused by John C. Maxwell, a well-known and influential motivational speaker, and (...) briefly discuss some of the obvious problems that it faces. I will then examine a more sophisticated version of the Golden Rule espoused by philosopher Harry Gensler. While able to overcome some of the problems of the literal Golden Rule, Gensler's version nevertheless shares a common difficulty with it: in both cases, the moral agent is asked to imagine themselves in the place of another. Maxwell things this is easily done, and Gensler asks for vividness and accuracy in this act of imagination. I wish to show that any version of the Golden Rule that takes seriously the need to imagine oneself in the place of another is to ask one to do the impossible, so any versions of the Golden Rule that require this should be rejected. (shrink)

This article comprises an up-to-date critical review of the field known as Economic Methodology or Philosophy of Economics (EM/PE). Two edited volumes (Kincaid and Ross 2021; Heilmann and Reiss 2021), a special issue of the Journal of Economic Methodology (2021), and a recent bibliometric analysis of the field (Claveau et al. 2021) constitute the basis of the review. Drawing on these sources, we identify a number of problematic trends in current EM/PE research. We claim that these trends could be interpreted (...) as two kinds of biases, namely a micro-level bias and a mainstream bias. We discuss the respective details of these biases and their normative implications for the discipline. (shrink)

Desde la conquista española ha existido una dicotomía constante en la identidad peruana, la cual se refleja en el arte y especialmente en la literatura. Es en ella en la que existe un personaje que representa en sus obras de manera magistral los encuentros y desencuentros generados por la interacción constante de esos dos hemisferios culturales presentes en la peruanidad. Es José María Arguedas, quien no solamente retrata dicha realidad, sino que a través del indigenismo logra representar y revalorizar la (...) figura del indio y por consiguiente de lo andino, todo en el marco de la problemática constante que aqueja la búsqueda de lo que consiste ser peruano. Tomando como referencia tres importantes obras de su producción intelectual como son: “Los ríos profundos”, “El Sexto” y “El zorro de arriba y el zorro de abajo”. (shrink)

Samuel Kerstein’s recent (2013) How To Treat Persons is an ambitious attempt to develop a new, broadly Kantian account of what it is to treat others as mere means and what it means to act in accordance with others’ dignity. His project is explicitly nonfoundationalist: his interpretation stands or falls on its ability to accommodate our pretheoretic intuitions, and he does an admirable job of handling carefully a range of well fleshed out and sometimes subtle examples. In what follows, (...) I shall give a quick summary of the chapters and then say two good things about the book and one critical thing. (shrink)

There are many possible definitions of “technology” and I will discuss some of these in this book. However, in this introduction let me use a definition of Svante Lindqvist who defines technology very intuitively as “those activities, directed towards the satisfaction of human wants, which produce change in the material world.” He says also “the distinction between human “wants” and more limited human “needs” is crucial, for we do not use technology only to satisfy our essential material requirements.” Consequently, from (...) this perspective, a technology that is “broken” could be defined as those activities, directed towards the satisfaction of human wants that are intended to produce changes in the material world that either do not manage to satisfy these wants or do not produce changes in the material world, or both. This is the third edition, updated October 2015. (shrink)

This book is the result of a collective research effort performed during many years in both Sweden and Spain. It is the result of attempting to develop a new field of research that could we denominate «human act informatics.» The goal has been to use the technologies of information to the study of the human act in general, including embodied acts and disembodied acts. The book presents a theory of the quantification of the informational value of human acts as order, (...) opposing the living order against entropy. We present acting as a set of decisions and choices aimed to create order and to impose Modernity. Karl Popper’s frequency theory of probability is applied to characterize human acts regarding their degree of freedom and to set up a scale of order in human decisions. The traditional theory of economics and social science characterize the human act as rational, utilitarian and ethical. Our results emphasize that the unique significance of an act lies in its capacity to generate order. An adequate methodology is then presented to defend such hypothesis according to which, the rationality respective irrationality of acting, is in fact only a function of the act’s organizational capacity. From this perspective, it has been necessary to define «order» respective «disorder» as operative concepts that allowed the comparison of the organizational differences generated by each kind of act. According to the presented conclusions, the spontaneity of living, as unconscious thinking, dreaming, loving, etc. and the mainstream of the human acts, are utilitarian, but in an irrational way; they are rooted in unconscious drifts and therefore must be considered irrational-utility acts. (shrink)

Se presenta una visión de la epistemología como lógica del pensar y se la lleva a una elaboración de la práctica clínica como una lógica del padecimiento psíquico. Esto basado en los planteamientos de Deleuze y Guattari. Para ello se toma como punto de partida la noción de los movimientos aberrantes que, leyendo la obra de Deleuze, elaboró David Lapoujade entendiéndolos como movimientos que se producen en la relación entre distintos términos heterogéneos, pero manteniendo su heterogeneidad. Esto es vinculado con (...) la invitación que hace el mismo Lapoujade a entender la obra deleuzeana como el desarrollo de lógicas irracionales, intentando pensar desde ahí una lógica de la locura y del padecimiento mental con base en, a su vez, una lógica de las obras literarias de Proust y Kafka, tal como las leen los mismos Deleuze y Guattari. En relación con ello destacamos, por un lado, cierta lógica de conjuntos abiertos y no totalizables que estos últimos autores encuentran en la obra de Proust y, por otro lado, una lógica de la contigüidad que encuentran en la obra de Kafka. Al mismo tiempo, se establecen puntos en común entre estas dos lecturas a propósito de lo esquizoide como algo que excede a la significación del discurso, así como a la normatividad de la conducta. Asimismo, en distintos puntos del escrito se extraerán las implicaciones que estos modos de pensar tienen para una práctica clínica en relación con modos de existencia subjetivos que se escapan a lo que está establecido en el campo social. De esa manera, ponemos en conjunción una aproximación epistemológica con una política. (shrink)

In Wilmot-Smith’s recent “Law, ‘Ought’, and ‘Can’,” he argues that legal obligation does not imply ability. In this short reply, I show that Wilmot-Smith’s arguments do not withstand critical scrutiny. In section 1, I attack Wilmot-Smith’s argument for the claim that allowing for impossible obligations makes for a better legal system, and I introduce positive grounds for thinking otherwise. In section 2, I show that, even if Wilmot-Smith had established that impossible obligations make for a better legal system, his subsequent (...) attack on OIC fails. (shrink)

Much attention has been paid to moral understanding as an individual achievement, when a single agent gains insight into distinctly moral matters. Crucially overlooked, I argue, is the phenomenon of shared moral understanding, when you and I understand moral matters together, in a way that can’t be reduced to each of us having moral understanding on our own. My argument pays close attention to two central moral practices: justifying our actions to others, and apologizing for wrongdoing. I argue that, whenever (...) I owe you a justification or an apology, I thereby owe it to you to aim at our coming to a shared moral understanding. My argument has two upshots. The first is a novel explanation of the importance of moral understanding in our lives, one that emphasizes the importance of understanding moral reasons together. The second is a better understanding of the very obligations involved in two of our most central interpersonal moral practices. (shrink)

This book studies the technognomies of memory in scripto as in texts, lists, dictionaries and databases and less the technognomies of memory in vivo (as in remembering). There are of course some relations between these two kinds of memories, being memory-in-scripto a development parallel to the development of written language. We notice that the historical presentation is built upon both forms of memory. We notice that the historical explanation is tied to the concrete experience of persons belonging to a culture. (...) In the history of memory then, it is necessary to distinguish two important aspects, the development of spoken memory and the development of written memory. The essential characteristic of written memory is its muteness. Muteness is also associated to spatiality and to stability. On the other hand, audial presentations are inseparable of the notions of movement and time passing. According to Don Ihde the spheres of the invisible and the silent, limit the spheres of the visual and the audial. These two spheres overlap partially in visual presentations that also are audial presentations; however, their natural being is to be independent from each other. [Ihde, Don. Listening and Voice. Phenomenologies of Sound; State University Press; 2007; p. 50-51.] In our time, which is also the time of the globalization and digitalization of culture, a new philosophical paradigm is going on characterized by the fragmentation of experience. This fragmentation does not allow an overview of the totality of a field of experience, which is only possible to reduce to singular analytical moments. The fragmentation of experience is the result of a new jump of the capability to concretion. Inside this new paradigm, the world becomes multistable. The multistability of the world creates a gap between intention and implementation that distinguishes the “full” history as Natural history from the “broken” history as Cultural history. (shrink)

Identity labels like ‘woman’, ‘Black’, ‘mother’, and ‘evangelical’ are pervasive in both political and personal life, and in both formal and informal classification and communication. They are also widely thought to undermine agency by essentializing groups, flattening individual distinctiveness, and enforcing discrimination. While we take these worries to be well-founded, we argue that they result from a particular practice, of using labels to rigidly label others. We identify an alternative practice, of playful self-labeling, and argue that it can function as (...) a tool for combating oppression by expressing and enhancing individual and collective agency. (shrink)

This article challenges the association between realist methodology and ideals of legitimacy. Many who seek a more “realistic” or “political” approach to political theory replace the familiar orientation towards a state of justice with a structurally similar orientation towards a state of legitimacy. As a result, they fail to provide more reliable practical guidance, and wrongly displace radical demands. Rather than orienting action towards any state of affairs, I suggest that a more practically useful approach to political theory would directly (...) address judgments, by comparing the concrete possibilities for action faced by real political actors. (shrink)

Fragmentalism was originally introduced as a new A-theory of time. It was further refined and discussed, and different developments of the original insight have been proposed. In a celebrated paper, Jonathan Simon contends that fragmentalism delivers a new realist account of the quantum state—which he calls conservative realism—according to which: the quantum state is a complete description of a physical system, the quantum state is grounded in its terms, and the superposition terms are themselves grounded in local goings-on about the (...) system in question. We will argue that fragmentalism, at least along the lines proposed by Simon, does not offer a new, satisfactory realistic account of the quantum state. This raises the question about whether there are some other viable forms of quantum fragmentalism. (shrink)

In collective action problems, large numbers of contributions together produce a good outcome, but any one contribution often makes no difference. Many philosophers think that act consequentialism implies that individuals should not contribute in these cases, given that their contributions cannot be expected to affect the outcome. Nearly everyone has assumed that the relevant expected effects of an action are those effects that are counterfactually dependent on what a given agent does. This assumption is at the heart of causal decision (...) theory. In contrast, evidential decision theory evaluates actions on the basis of whatever can be expected to happen, given that the agent performs some action, where this includes events that are simply correlated with the action. I show that causal and evidentialist versions of act consequentialism can diverge in collective action problems. Evidential decision theory can require us to do our part even when causal decision theory does not. (shrink)

This book is a personal answer to the crisis of the left. The author of this text belongs to a generation habituated to live with global explanations. During our youth, the future of the world was the future of democracy and socialism. We belong to a generation of “leftist” that found in Marx and Freud, phenomenology and structuralism the most important answers that made sense of the everyday world. However, the developments of events during the last sixty years showed that (...) our confidence was ungrounded. The depreciation of the theoretical thought accelerated in direct proportion to the development of technologies, and among them the impact of the digital developments was devastating. One of the most notable consequences of the digitalization of culture was the depreciation of the Marxian thought, but also the less recognized depreciation of all kinds of political-economic thought. The collapse of the world created before the Second World War open for the end of the “grand narratives” and the enthronization of Postmodernism. The production of fragmentary explanations took over the historical perspective with an important influence on social and economic thought. After 60 years of postmodern thinking, we believe that the time of Postmodernism is over. Politicians and economists over the world cannot continue to produce results in small packages. The whole picture must be restituted. Of course it must be done incorporating the lessons of the past to avoid to make the same mistakes. Postmodernism has left behind lots of scattered modernist philosophical remnants. It left a chessboard with only few pieces to work with, and in this allegory, only as references. The philosophical schools remains, but the study of them is strictly for an education in the history of ideas. The situation is aggravating since the most important works from the 1960’s and forth, (post-structuralists) deliberately have avoided obvious identity patterns. A word in Rio de la Plata’s jargon language describes this situation, cambalache, a sort of “flea market” where everything lies higgledy-piggledy. Deconstruction and the focus on differences are vital to Postmodernism. Remaining is therefore the intersections, the contrasts, shadows, and sketches. When trying to orient in such an intellectual environment, the task reminds of patching scatterings, and building with tools of eclecticism. However, we believe that is time to reconstruct instead of deconstruct, moving back to Modernism that we will describe as Cyborgism. (shrink)

The 20th Century is the starting point for the most ambitious attempts to extrapolate human life into artificial systems. Norbert Wiener’s Cybernetics, Claude Shannon’s Information Theory, John von Neumann’s Cellular Automata, Universal Constructor to the Turing Test, Artificial Intelligence to Maturana and Varela’s Autopoietic Organization, all shared the goal of understanding in what sense humans resemble a machine. This scientific and technological movement has embraced all disciplines without exceptions, not only mathematics and physics but also biology, sociology, psychology, economics etc. (...) New terms were developed, such as “information”, “organization”, “entropy”, “communication”, “encryption”, “computation” and “algorithmics” to mention a few, all which had an enormous impact on artificial systems. Our work follows this historical track but with a reversed order of priorities. Instead of deducing a reduced group of human acts into an artificial environment, we deduce the human aspects of machines by extrapolating algorithmic methodologies into everyday life acts. The present informational theories were insufficiently powered to achieve this objective without developing a new theoretical approach. Hence, our research is directed towards an expansion of the current informational theories. (shrink)

I provide a theory of the metaphysical foundations of identity: an account what grounds facts of the form a=b. In particular, I defend the claim that indiscernibility grounds identity. This is typically rejected because it is viciously circular; plausible assumptions about the logic of ground entail that the fact that a=b partially grounds itself. The theory I defend is immune to this circularity.

Leibniz’s views on modality are among the most discussed by his interpreters. Although most of the discussion has focused on Leibniz’s analyses of modality, this essay explores Leibniz’s grounding of modality. Leibniz holds that possibilities and possibilia are grounded in the intellect of God. Although other early moderns agreed that modal truths are in some way dependent on God, there were sharp disagreements surrounding two distinct questions: (1) On what in God do modal truths and modal truth-makers depend? (2) What (...) is the manner(s) of dependence by which modal truths and modal truth-makers depend on God? Very roughly, Leibniz’s own answers are: (1) God’s intellect and (2) a form of ontological dependence. The essay first distinguishes Leibniz’s account from two nearby (and often misunderstood) alternatives found in Descartes and Spinoza. It then examines Leibniz’s theory in detail, showing how, on his account, God’s ideas provide both truth-makers for possibilities and necessities and an ontological foothold for those truth-makers, thereby explaining modal truths. Along the way, it suggests several refinements and possible amendments to Leibniz’s grounding thesis. It then defends Leibniz against a pair of recent objections by Robert Merrihew Adams and Andrew Chignell that invoke the early work of Kant. I conclude that whereas Leibniz’s alternative avoids collapsing into yet another form of Spinozism, the alternatives proposed by Adams, Chignell, and the early Kant do not. (shrink)

We sometimes fail unwittingly to do things that we ought to do. And we are, from time to time, culpable for these unwitting omissions. We provide an outline of a theory of responsibility for unwitting omissions. We emphasize two distinctive ideas: (i) many unwitting omissions can be understood as failures of appropriate vigilance, and; (ii) the sort of self-control implicated in these failures of appropriate vigilance is valuable. We argue that the norms that govern vigilance and the value of self-control (...) explain culpability for unwitting omissions. (shrink)

In this paper, we focus on whether and to what extent we judge that people are responsible for the consequences of their forgetfulness. We ran a series of behavioral studies to measure judgments of responsibility for the consequences of forgetfulness. Our results show that we are disposed to hold others responsible for some of their forgetfulness. The level of stress that the forgetful agent is under modulates judgments of responsibility, though the level of care that the agent exhibits toward performing (...) the forgotten action does not. We argue that this result has important implications for a long-running debate about the nature of responsible agency. (shrink)

Judgments of blame for others are typically sensitive to what an agent knows and desires. However, when people act negligently, they do not know what they are doing and do not desire the outcomes of their negligence. How, then, do people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing? We propose that people attribute blame for negligent wrongdoing based on perceived mental control, or the degree to which an agent guides their thoughts and attention over time. To acquire information about others’ mental control, (...) people self-project their own perceived mental control to anchor third-personal judgments about mental control and concomitant responsibility for negligent wrongdoing. In four experiments (N = 841), we tested whether perceptions of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Study 1 showed that the ease with which people can counterfactually imagine an individual being non-negligent mediated the relationship between judgments of control and blame. Studies 2a and 2b indicated that perceived mental control has a strong effect on judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and that first-personal judgments of mental control are moderately correlated with third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing. Finally, we used an autobiographical memory manipulation in Study 3 to make personal episodes of forgetfulness salient. Participants for whom past personal episodes of forgetfulness were made salient judged negligent wrongdoers less harshly compared to a control group for whom past episodes of negligence were not salient. Collectively, these findings suggest that first-personal judgments of mental control drive third-personal judgments of blame for negligent wrongdoing and indicate a novel role for counterfactual thinking in the attribution of responsibility. (shrink)

Cognitive science has recently made some startling discoveries about temporal experience, and these discoveries have been drafted into philosophical service. We survey recent appeals to cognitive science in the philosophical debate over whether time objectively passes. Since this research is currently in its infancy, we identify some directions for future research.

In response to the spread of COVID-19, governments across the world have, with very few exceptions, enacted sweeping restrictive lockdown policies that impede citizens’ freedom to move, work, and assemble. This paper critically responds to the central arguments for restrictive lockdown legislation. We build our critique on the following assumption: public policy that enjoys virtually unanimous support worldwide should be justified by uncontroversial moral principles. We argue that that the virtually unanimous support in favor of restrictive lockdowns is not adequately (...) justified by the arguments given in favor of them. Importantly, this is not to say that states ought not impose restrictive lockdown measures, but rather that the extent of the acceptance of these measures is not proportionate to the strength of the arguments for lockdowns. -/- We begin by exploring the case for restrictive lockdowns. We first argue that several of the principles that are used to justify the lockdowns yield unexpectedly revisionary implications for other political problems that many would be unwilling to accept. We then outline what we consider the strongest argument for a lockdown—namely, that its net welfare benefits are great enough to defeat the moral presumption against restricting citizens’ civil liberties to move, work, and assemble. However, we give a number of reasons for doubting that the lockdown’s net welfare benefits are, in fact, sufficiently high to defeat the presumption against it. (shrink)

According to Aristotle, the medical art aims at health, which is a virtue of the body, and does so in an unlimited way. Consequently, medicine does not determine the extent to which health should be pursued, and “mental health” falls under medicine only via pros hen predication. Because medicine is inherently oriented to its end, it produces health in accordance with its nature and disease contrary to its nature—even when disease is good for the patient. Aristotle’s politician understands that this (...) inherent orientation can be systematically distorted, and so would see the need for something like the Hippocratic Oath. (shrink)

P. Kyle Stanford defends the problem of unconceived alternatives, which maintains that scientists are unlikely to conceive of all the scientifically plausible alternatives to the theories they accept. Stanford’s argument has been criticized on the grounds that the failure of individual scientists to conceive of relevant alternatives does not entail the failure of science as a corporate body to do so. I consider two replies to this criticism and find both lacking. In the process, I argue that Stanford does not (...) provide evidence that there are likely scientifically plausible unconceived alternatives to scientific theories accepted now and in the future. (shrink)

Perdurantists think of continuants as mereological sums of stages from different times. This view of persistence would force us to drop the idea that there is genuine change in the world. By exploiting a presentist metaphysics, Brogaard proposed a theory, called presentist four-dimensionalism, that aims to reconcile perdurantism with the idea that things undergo real change. However, her proposal commits us to reject the idea that stages must exist in their entirety. Giving up the tenet that all the stages are (...) equally real could be a price that perdurantists are unwilling to pay. I argue that Kit Fine ’s fragmentalism provides us with the tools to combine a presentist metaphysics with a perdurantist theory of persistence without giving up the idea that reality is constituted by more than purely present stages. (shrink)

Josh is a typical 27-year-old in a career that he enjoys and a successful marriage. Josh begins to exhibit the symptoms of a manic episode. He is soon diagnosed with bipolar disorder. While non-manic, Josh’s preferences are typical. While manic, his preferences change dramatically. He quits his job, cheats on his partner, and squanders his savings. These are behaviors that Josh, when non-manic (euthymic), would never agree to. When Josh returns to a euthymic state, he regrets these decisions. Should those (...) close to Josh have prevented him from making these decisions, or does his competence to decide persist despite his acute mania? In this paper, I examine the connections be-tween bipolar disorder and consent. I defend the view that many (although far from all) individuals with bipolar disorder are competent to consent to a wide variety of things when they are in a manic state. This means that mania should not be presumed to undermine competence in clinical settings. -/- I have several goals in this paper. I want to bring philosophy to bear on the connection between consent and bipolar disorder. Additionally, I intend this paper to contribute to the general debate about the conditions of informed consent. Bipolar disorder presents novel challenges to existing conceptions of competence to consent which require stable core of values for an agent to be competent. For example, Buchanan and Brock endorse such a view. In showing that shifting values do not undermine the competence of a person experiencing acute mania, I show that the aforementioned views of competence are false. Overall, this paper makes substantive contributions to the debate about competence to consent and presents the first sustained philosophical treatment of consent among people with bipolar disorder. (shrink)

In this paper, I will argue that there is a version of possibilism—inspired by the modal analogue of Kit Fine’s fragmentalism—that can be combined with a weakening of actualism. The reasons for analysing this view, which I call Modal Fragmentalism, are twofold. Firstly, it can enrich our understanding of the actualism/possibilism divide, by showing that, at least in principle, the adoption of possibilia does not correspond to an outright rejection of the actualist intuitions. Secondly, and more specifically, it can enrich (...) our understanding of concretism, by proving that, at least in principle, the idea that objects have properties in an absolute manner is compatible with transworld identity. (shrink)

Dasgupta poses a serious challenge to realism about natural properties. He argues that there is no acceptable explanation of why natural properties deserve the value realists assign to them and are consequently absent of value. In response, this paper defines and defends an alternative non-explanatory account of normativity compatible with realism. Unlike Lewis and Sider, who believe it is sufficient to defend realism solely on realist terms, I engage with the challenge on unfriendly grounds by revealing a tu quoque. Dasgupta (...) and anti-realists face a similar challenge to that directed against realism: one that not only undermines the objection to realism by legitimising non-explanatory normativity but leaves them facing a significant dilemma. (shrink)

I argue that metaethicists should be concerned with two kinds of alienation that can result from theories of normativity: alienation between an agent and her reasons, and alienation between an agent and the concrete others with whom morality is principally concerned. A theory that cannot avoid alienation risks failing to make sense of central features of our experience of being agents, in whose lives normativity plays an important role. The twin threats of alienation establish two desiderata for theories of normativity; (...) however, I argue that they are difficult to jointly satisfy. (shrink)

This paper examines the interplay of semantics and pragmatics within the domain of film. Films are made up of individual shots strung together in sequences over time. Though each shot is disconnected from the next, combinations of shots still convey coherent stories that take place in continuous space and time. How is this possible? The semantic view of film holds that film coherence is achieved in part through a kind of film language, a set of conventions which govern the relationships (...) between shots. In this paper, we develop and defend a new version of the semantic view. We articulate it for a pair of conventions that govern spatial relations between viewpoints. One such rule is already well-known; sometimes called the "180° Rule," we term it the X-Constraint; to this we add a previously unrecorded rule, the T-Constraint. As we show, both have the effect, in different ways, of limiting the way that viewpoint can shift through space from shot to shot over the course of a film sequence. Such constraints, we contend, are analogous to relations of discourse coherence that are widely recognized in the linguistic domain. If film is to have a language, it is a language made up of rules like these. (shrink)

This Element, written for researchers and students in philosophy and the behavioral sciences, reviews and critically assesses extant work on number concepts in developmental psychology and cognitive science. It has four main aims. First, it characterizes the core commitments of mainstream number cognition research, including the commitment to representationalism, the hypothesis that there exist certain number-specific cognitive systems, and the key milestones in the development of number cognition. Second, it provides a taxonomy of influential views within mainstream number cognition research, (...) along with the central challenges these views face. Third, it identifies and critically assesses a series of core philosophical assumptions often adopted by number cognition researchers. Finally, the Element articulates and defends a novel version of pluralism about number concepts. (shrink)

My primary target in this paper is a puzzle that emerges from the conjunction of several seemingly innocent assumptions in action theory and the metaphysics of moral responsibility. The puzzle I have in mind is this. On one widely held account of moral responsibility, an agent is morally responsible only for those actions or outcomes over which that agent exercises control. Recently, however, some have cited cases where agents appear to be morally responsible without exercising any control. This leads some (...) to abandon the control-based account of responsibility and replace it with an alternative account. It leads others to deny the intuition that agents are responsible in these troublesome cases. After outlining the account of moral responsibility I have in mind, I look at some of the arguments made against the viability of this theory. I show that there are conceptual resources for salvaging the control account, focusing in particular on the nature of vigilance. I also argue that there is empirical data that supports the control account so conceived. (shrink)

The thesis of theory-ladenness of observations, in its various guises, is widely considered as either ill-conceived or harmless to the rationality of science. The latter view rests partly on the work of the proponents of New Experimentalism who have argued, among other things, that experimental practices are efficient in guarding against any epistemological threat posed by theory-ladenness. In this paper I show that one can generate a thesis of theory-ladenness for experimental practices from an influential New Experimentalist account. The notion (...) I introduce for this purpose is the concept of ‘theory-driven data reliability judgments’, according to which theories which are sought to be tested with a particular set of data guide reliability judgments about those very same data. I provide various prominent historical examples to show that TDRs are used by scientists to resolve data conflicts. I argue that the rationality of the practices which employ TDRs can be saved if the independent support of the theories driving TDRs is construed in a particular way. (shrink)

Actors, undercover investigators, and readers of fiction sometimes report “losing themselves” in the characters they imitate or read about. They speak of “taking on” or “assuming” the beliefs, thoughts, and feelings of someone else. I offer an account of this strange but familiar phenomenon—what I call imaginative transportation.

Much current debate in the metaphysics of time is between A-theorists and B-theorists. Central to this debate is the assumption that time exists and that the task of metaphysics is to catalogue time’s features. Relatively little consideration has been given to an error theory about time. Since there is very little extant work on temporal error theory the goal of this paper is simply to lay the groundwork to allow future discussion of the relative merits of such a view. The (...) paper thus develops a conceptual framework from within which to evaluate claims about the actual existence, or not, of temporality as that notion appears in folk discourses about time, and from there to examine claims about the counterfactual existence, or not, of temporality so conceived. We subsequently apply this framework to three extant positions drawn from physics and metaphysics that deny the existence of time. We show that only one of these positions is a folk temporal error theory; that is, a view that denies the existence of time as that notion is operative in our everyday thought and talk. (shrink)

Most democratic theorists agree that concentrations of wealth and power tend to distort the functioning of democracy and ought to be countered wherever possible. Deliberative democrats are no exception: though not its only potential value, the capacity of deliberation to ‘neutralise power’ is often regarded as ‘fundamental’ to deliberative theory. Power may be neutralised, according to many deliberative democrats, if citizens can be induced to commit more fully to the deliberative resolution of common problems. If they do, they will be (...) unable to get away with inconsistencies and bad or private reasons, thereby mitigating the illegitimate influence of power. I argue, however, that the means by which power inflects political disagreement is far more subtle than this model suggests and cannot be countered so simply. As a wealth of recent research in political psychology demonstrates, human beings persistently exhibit ‘motivated reasoning’, meaning that even when we are sincerely committed to the deliberative resolution of common problems, and even when we are exposed to the same reasons and evidence, we still disagree strongly about what ‘fair cooperation’ entails. Motivated reasoning can be counteracted, but only under exceptional circumstances such as those that enable modern science, which cannot be reliably replicated in our society at large. My analysis suggests that in democratic politics – which rules out the kind of anti-democratic practices available to scientists – we should not expect deliberation to reliably neutralise power. (shrink)